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Abstract 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), obviously, make crucial use of satellites operating in an 
area commonly known as “outer space,” raising issues regarding which specific body of law might 
rule the operations of such satellite systems. Though the “horizontal” boundary between outer space 
and the underlying area of airspaces has never been authoritatively defined, it has generally been 
agreed that those two areas differ fundamentally as to the legal regimes ruling them, giving rise 
indeed to a specific body of “space law.” 
 
Airspace is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the respective underlying state, and that 
state can therefore exercise a level of discretion in prohibiting or conditioning activities in 
that area which is only limited by international obligations resting upon that state—for 
instance, following certain international aviation treaties. The only exception here concerns 
airspaces over international waters, for which the 1944 Chicago Convention provides a 
general solution regarding the regulation of aviation for safety purposes. In general, as a 
consequence the use of GNSS and their services in the context of aviation is dealt with by air 
law, national as well as international, as a body of law principally regulating activities in 
airspaces, national as well as international. 
Outer space, by contrast, is defined as an area not subject as such to any territorial or 
quasi-territorial sovereignty, a virtual “global commons,” where the freedom of use and 
exploration is the baseline legal principle and such freedom can only be curtailed, at the 
international level, by applicable international (space) law. This principle has been codified 
in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, to which all important spacefaring nations are party. The 
Outer Space Treaty at the same time provides for a first embryonic set of international 
obligations resting upon states which limit the baseline freedom of use and exploration, 
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while several other space treaties as well as customary international law and more general 
treaties which impact outer space and space activities provide for further limitations. This 
is what is commonly labeled “space law,” a body of (in first instance international) rules 
addressing such space activities. Only at a secondary level, national law or (in the case of 
the European Union) EU law plays a role, partly in implementing and applying the inter-
national regime in a national respectively EU context. 
When analyzing to what extent space law has an impact on GNSS, furthermore, we 
should realize that GNSS from an overarching legal perspective comprises five main ele-
ments: (1) ground stations controlling by way of (2) radio signals (3) the satellites launched 
into and then operating in outer space, emitting (4) the position, navigation, and timing 
(PNT) signals allowing (5) relevant receivers to calculate positioning and navigation infor-
mation. 
Elements (1) and (5) are not generally considered to be a subject which space law should 
regulate, as they fall completely within the sovereign jurisdiction of whatever state the 
ground stations respectively receivers find itself in. For the sake of simplicity, any receiver 
infrastructure in outer space is not further discussed in the contribution, whereas any sim-
ilar receiver infrastructure in airspace is subsumed within the concept of receivers as it is 
legally subject to the same territorial jurisdiction (as further regulated internationally by 
air law). 
Elements (2) and (4), which at least in part traverse outer space on their way to respec-
tively back from the satellites, are effectively dealt with already by an international body 
of law dealing with all communications, not with space communications only; hence these 
will not be dealt with in any detail here. 
For completeness’s sake, suffice it here to point to the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) which, in a legal sense, operates on the basis of the ITU Constitution, the ITU 
Convention, and whatever is the most recent version of the Radio Regulations, listed in 
Additional Resources near the end of this article. Once it had become clear that satellites 
could be integrated in the international infrastructure for communications in the late 1950s, 
it was agreed that the ITU presented the obvious forum to address these issues as it had 
since decades already addressed the issue of potential interference on the international 
level, by developing and implementing an elaborate system of coordination of frequency 
use. The ITU’s legal involvement with satellites, including GNSS, remains limited however 
to such coordination of frequencies and attendant orbits. 
That leaves most prominently element (3) to be subject to space law. Following primar-
ily from the aforementioned Outer Space Treaty and two of its successor treaties, the 1972 
Liability Convention and the 1975 Registration Convention (see Additional Resources), the 
following fundamental legal rules and obligations would then arise which are of particular 
importance for GNSS. 
 
Freedom of Use and Exploration for the Benefit of All Mankind 
 
This principle notably emanates from Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty and would 
generally include the use of satellites for positioning, timing, and navigation purposes. The 
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limits to this freedom under the Outer Space Treaty are fairly limited and remain essen-
tially confined to an obligation to comply with general international law as applicable (Ar-
ticle III, Outer Space Treaty, which specifically references the UN Charter), to undertake 
reasonable efforts to avoid harmful interference with other legitimate space activities (Ar-
ticle IX, Outer Space Treaty) and to share any relevant scientific information gathered in 
the context of operations with the world community (Article XI, Outer Space Treaty). 
Conversely, it will be clear that GNSS actually contributes—at least in principle—to the 
benefits of space activities for all mankind, since it allows many activities on earth or in the 
airspaces above it to take place safer, quicker, and more efficiently. This would apply in 
particular, of course, to the extent the GNSS signals would be openly and freely available—
which currently is the case with GPS and GLONASS Standard Positioning Signals, whereas 
also BeiDou and Galileo plan to offer such openly and freely accessible signals. 
The only exceptions would be where GNSS would be used, for instance, for supporting 
the unlawful use of force, so as to violate Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. This would 
mainly refer to the use of force other than in the exercise of the right of self-defense (Article 
51, UN Charter) or following a mandate of the UN Security Council (Article 42, UN Charter). 
 
Responsibility of States for National Activities in Outer Space 
 
This responsibility also pertains to the operation of GNSS satellites. If such satellites are 
involved in activities violating the rights of other states (such as referenced above), it will 
be the state or states as whose “national activities” these operations qualify, which will be 
held responsible under international law (Article VI, Outer Space Treaty). Such violations 
would then give rise to a requirement for the violating state(s) to remedy the situation and 
as appropriate apologize, punish responsible operators, and/or provide assurances that 
such violations will not occur again. This is independent from the occurrence of actual 
damage, which may in addition give rise to obligations to compensate for such damage, 
even beyond the particular concept of liability dealt with below. Thus, the United States 
would be responsible for GPS operations, the Russian Federation for GLONASS opera-
tions, and the People’s Republic of China for BeiDou operations. 
Since such state responsibility also pertains to satellite operations conducted by private 
operators, any future private operator of Galileo pursuant to a concession would also give 
rise to the responsibility of the state(s) as whose “national activities in outer space” such 
operations would qualify. The idea of having Galileo operated under a concession, as orig-
inally intended by the European Commission, turned out to be premature, but it cannot 
and is not excluded that in the future this may change. 
While the EU is in the political and financial lead when it comes to Galileo, and the 
European Space Agency (ESA) has been the initial developer in a technical and operational 
sense, pursuant to Articles VI and XIII of the Outer Space Treaty such international respon-
sibility ultimately rests with the member states, or at least with the member states which 
are involved specifically in the Galileo programs. To what extent the seat of the European 
GNSS Agency (GSA), the hosting of ground stations for the purpose of Galileo, or relative 
investments into Galileo might cause for specific responsibility of specific member states 
is an issue for internal considerations; any third state complaining about any perceived 
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illegality of Galileo operations would in principle have the choice to address any such com-
plaints against any of the EU and ESA member states. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty furthermore requires the “appropriate State” to 
ensure “authorization and continuing supervision” of nongovernmental entities. As long 
as Galileo operations would remain the domain of the GSA, as an agency of the European 
Commission, Articles VI and XIII would allow the European Union to effectively exercise 
such control over Galileo operations. As soon as, however, a private concessionaire were 
to take over as operator, one or the other EU/ESA member state would have to step into 
the breach to ensure the aforementioned “authorization and continuing supervision,” even 
if in practice the EU/GSA could still be used as the “tool” to achieve that aim. 
 
Liability of States for Physical Damage Caused by Space Objects 
 
Pursuant to this principle, although following a different scheme of attribution based on 
fundamental involvement with the launch of the space objects concerned (namely that of 
the so-called “launching State” of the space object at issue; Article VII, Outer Space Treaty; 
Articles I, II & III, Liability Convention), states are not only responsible but also liable for 
physical damage caused by space objects. Such damage would then give rise to an obliga-
tion to compensate for the damage, which is fault-based only to the extent that damage is 
caused to other space objects (Articles II & III, Liability Convention) and is in principle 
without limit (Article XII). 
In other words, if a GPS satellite would crash into another space object, the United States 
would be held liable for the damage caused thereby to the extent the crash would be con-
sidered its fault; if the damage by contrast would take place on earth or to aircraft in flight, 
the United States would be held liable without further ado. The same obviously would 
apply for the Russian Federation with respect to GLONASS and the People’s Republic of 
China with respect to BeiDou. 
It is important to note here that damage is defined, following the general interpretation 
of the Liability Convention, as direct damage caused by physical impact, meaning that 
nonphysical damage such as radio interference or indirect damage—an aircraft crashing 
as a consequence of erroneous GNSS information; loss of revenues due to interference—
are not compensable. In the context of discussions within the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), for instance, the United States has consistently denied any liability 
for damage which users of GPS signals or services could suffer due to their trust in those 
signals or services being unwarranted. Only exceptionally it has been claimed by authors 
that liability for signals and services emanating from GNSS satellites could be equated to 
“damage caused by the satellites,” and hence be subject to liability claims pursuant to the 
Liability Convention. In the US case, it has only been admitted that under particular cir-
cumstances liability claims against the US government could be entertained in US courts, 
to the extent that the Federal Tort Claims Act or Suits in Admiralty Acts might be invoked. 
Victims of such types of damages should therefore seek compensation either under the 
heading of state responsibility as addressed above or in a private capacity in a relevant 
national court. 
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Again, international liability also applies for privately owned and/or operated GNSS 
systems; a possible future private concessionaire operating Galileo would thus only be 
held liable to the extent the states themselves liable would derogate such liability under 
the concession. While the Liability Convention in this respect offers intergovernmental or-
ganizations the opportunity to qualify as a state party to the Convention for practical pur-
poses (Article XXII, Liability Convention), ESA has so far complied with the relevant 
conditions but not the EU. Even to the extent ESA would be held liable for damage caused 
by Galileo (due to its initial involvement in system launch and deployment), ultimately the 
burden of compensation would come to rest upon the ESA member states. 
As for the EU, due to absence of its qualification pursuant to Article XXII of the Liability 
Convention as a de facto party to its regime, legally speaking it is an “invisible” entity. As-
serting a claim for damage caused by Galileo and otherwise falling within the scope of the 
Liability Convention against the EU or the EC consequently would not be legally possi-
ble—instead, if the victim state(s) would not favor addressing ESA as per the aforemen-
tioned option, the only option left would be to address individual EU member states who 
could all, legally-technically speaking, be argued to be procuring states (Article I(c)(i), Li-
ability Convention) of the Galileo satellite in question and hence liable. 
At the same time, it should be noted that in the Galileo context a substantial element of 
the proposed package of paid services (as opposed to the open GPS services for which no 
liability could unequivocally be claimed) would be the inclusion of liability acceptance on 
the part of the operator. To the extent this approach were to become accepted, users who 
would rely on Galileo services which would then turn out to be erroneous (hence such 
reliance would in hindsight be unjustified) and as a consequence cause damage to third 
parties, would be able to derogate the relevant third-party claims to the Galileo operator. 
An example on point would be an aircraft crashing as a consequence of malfunctioning of 
a Galileo service: the derogation of liability would allow the airline to shift the burden of 
any third-party liability claim under applicable air law treaties ultimately to the Galileo 
operator. 
 
Registration of Space Objects by States Involved in Their Launching 
 
Closely related to the international regime on liability summarized above, states are also 
required to register—at least in principle—the space objects for which they qualified as 
“launching State(s).” This registration obligation is actually twofold. On the one hand, 
states need to register such space objects in a national register, the details of which are 
further left to the state of registry (Article II(1), Registration Convention). On the other 
hand, they are required to provide the United Nations with a specific set of data for the 
purpose of inclusion in the international register (Articles III, IV, Registration Convention). 
Unfortunately, the latter obligation is qualified as “as soon as practicable” (Article IV(1), 
Registration Convention); coupled with the principled absence of an international moni-
toring organization, effectively this means that many satellites do not get registered at all 
(in particular if military in nature). 
A further problem concerns the impossibility—at least formally, as per the Registration 
Convention, to “unregister” or “deregister” satellites. The assumption had simply been that 
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satellites, once launched, would be owned and operated by their principal owner until 
their end of life, so the possibility of change of ownership in orbit was never seriously 
contemplated. 
Since the possibility of more than one state qualifying as a launching state is real, in 
view of the four alternative criteria for that, in relevant cases those states should determine 
which one of them is to fulfil the functions pursuant to the Registration Convention—dou-
ble registration is legally speaking not possible (Article II(2), Registration Convention). 
Clearly, following the above, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s 
Republic of China are required to register the satellites composing their respective GNSS. 
A final point of note concerns the fact that, while GPS, GLONASS, and BeiDou are obvi-
ously multisatellite systems, pursuant to the Registration Convention each individual 
launch carrying one or more satellites is registered individually—the main concern driving 
the registration regime was the launch phase as deemed the by far most risky and accident-
prone. 
As for Europe, though similarly to the Liability Convention under the Registration Con-
vention the possibility is open for an intergovernmental organization to become a “party” 
to the Convention for all practical purposes exists (Article VII, Registration Convention), 
again only ESA, not the EU has qualified as such. Any EU “register” of Galileo satellites, if 
ever contemplated, would not have any legal meaning pursuant to the Registration Con-
vention; (Note that in an effort to provide as much relevant identification-related infor-
mation to the general public, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs will include any such 
information provided by the European Union in the international register between brack-
ets, to distinguish it from information provided formally in accordance with the Registra-
tion Convention.) The absence moreover of a possibility to register such satellites in two 
or more states at the same time (Article II(2), registration Convention) also principally ex-
cludes such a register under the Convention. Galileo satellites, consequently, could be reg-
istered either by ESA or by any EU member state qualifying as the launching State. 
At least to the extent Galileo satellites are launched from Kourou on Ariane launchers, 
France would be the logical launching state, as the use of its territory and launch facilities 
for the launch would most unequivocally qualify it as a launching state—much more so 
than, for instance, Germany or Italy where the main control centers are hosted. In practice, 
as it turns out, ESA registered the GIOVE satellites in 2005 and 2008; the Galileo IOV and 
Galileo satellites launched from 2011 onward, however, were not officially registered with 
the United Nations, also raising legal questions regarding jurisdiction and control at least 
under international law (Article VIII, Outer Space Treaty). For more details on this, see 
Additional Resources. 
 
Mitigation of Space Debris 
 
The issue of space debris is not yet formally dealt with by the space treaties in any relevant 
detail: the provision coming closest to addressing the issue concerns that which requires a 
state which “has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its na-
tionals in outer space (. . .) would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
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and other celestial bodies” to “undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment” (Article IX, Outer Space Treaty). Vice 
versa as per the same Article, a state potentially victimized by such harmful interference 
may require consultations—yet there is not obligation not to create any space debris, let 
alone to clean up one’s own or indeed any space debris already out there. 
In that sense, the only remaining support coming directly from the space treaties of rel-
evance here would be the inclusion of space debris in the concept of “space object,” which 
means that damage caused by space debris under the Liability Convention would give rise 
to compensation—on the assumption, of course, that the launching state of that space de-
bris could (still) be identified. 
Only recently legal developments have started to address the problem of space debris 
more profoundly. Partly in further elaboration of the aforementioned Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the major space agencies gathered together in the Inter-Agency Space 
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) in 2002 drafted a first set of (legally nonbinding) 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, which has been further buttressed by a relevant set of 
UNCOPUS guidelines in 2010. Those guidelines may well develop into customary inter-
national law over the coming years, in particular as increasingly individual states licensing 
private operators include compliance with the guidelines in the conditions for being 
granted a license to undertake space activities in the first place—which is certainly binding 
upon those licensees. Of the countries concerned with GNSS, at least for the United States 
and the member states of ESA (which is a prominent member of the IADC) this holds true, 




While it is clear that GNSS constitutes one of the most beneficial space operations and 
space-based applications, the legal regime pursuant to international space law remains 
fairly general and limited in its specific guidance of such operations and activities. Partly 
that is due to a general lack of political awareness of the relevance of compliance with such 
issues as registration and space debris, which would hopefully change as more and more 
terrestrial users become dependent upon satellite navigation services. Partly it is due to 
the remaining crucial impact of national sovereignty in this particular field of international 
law; the absence of sovereign control by other states than the GNSS operator states over 
the applications on their territory or within their airspace and the potential consequences 
in terms of liability understandably causes a considerable amount of hesitation in allowing 
to reap the full potential benefits of GNSS. 
In Europe, with respect to Galileo, the legal situation is even more wanting. While ESA 
is able to register satellites and has actually done so with the first few launched, the leading 
position that the EU has increasingly taken in this respect has not yet translated into 
properly addressing such issues—neither have, probably as a consequence of the Union’s 
lead role, individual EU/ESA member states such as France, Germany, or Italy. Thus, even 
at the level of the fairly succinct body of international space law, much still needs to be 
done to arrive at a proper legal framework properly implemented. 
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